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1. The project 
Legal systems are in some respects like a building or a set of buildings. Not only because, like 
buildings, they are partly the result of conscious design, but also because they exhibit parts 
that are to some extent independent of each other, but that nevertheless hang together in a 
whole that may be more or less harmonious.  
 They are like buildings also in the sense that they are made out of ‘building blocks’. These 
building blocks themselves may consist of lower level building blocks, which may consist of 
even lower level building blocks … and so on, until the lowest level is reached. Think in this 
connection of a legal system that consists of different fields of law (e.g. contract law), where 
each field consists of a number of doctrines (e.g. freedom of contract, irrevocable offer, 
efficient breach), which are in turn built by means of lowest level rules (e.g. the rule that the 
offeror of an irrevocable offer does not have the competence to revoke the offer), which can 
in turn be analysed in terms of lowest level concepts such as ‘duty’, ‘competence’, etc. In this 
paper we refer to the lowest level elements as basic components of law or basic legal 
components. A basic legal component is one that does not contain any other component as a 
component part. A non-basic legal component, on the other hand, does contain another 
component.  
 Although different legal systems have different doctrines, the components of which they 
are built may be of the same types. This is a real possibility especially if the legal systems are 
related and the components are chosen on a sufficiently low level. In fact, the research project 
outlined in this paper rests on the following hypothesis:  
                                                 
1
  The authors should like to thank Bram Akkermans and Siegfried van Duffel for their useful comments on a 
draft version of this paper. 
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The private law of the different European countries can be reconstructed in terms of a limited 
set of the same basic concepts.  
 
The first purpose of the project is to test its underlying hypothesis. To do so, it will be 
necessary to identify the different basic concepts and to show how central doctrines of private 
law from different European systems can be expressed in terms of these concepts.  
 If the project’s underlying hypothesis is correct and we manage to identify a set of basic 
concepts, we will have a tool that can be used for several research lines in the field of 
European private law. One of these lines is the discussion about the harmonization of 
European private law, namely about the possibility and the desirability of such 
harmonization.
2
 A necessary precondition for a fruitful discussion is agreement about what 
harmonization would amount to. Under what circumstances can it be said that different parts 
of different legal systems (parts which may be concepts, rules, doctrines or even whole 
subject areas like contract law) are identical or normatively equivalent?
 3
 The availability of a 
set of basic concepts is a useful, if not indispensable tool for the analysis of legal fields and 
for the determination whether and, if so, to what extent they are identical or normatively 
equivalent. The second purpose of the project is therefore to make operational the notions of 
identity and normative equivalence of legal systems or parts thereof. 
 One step on the way towards the harmonization of European private law – a step that is 
also important in other respects – is the comparative description of the private law of different 
European legal systems. Such a comparative description presupposes a neutral conceptual 
framework in terms of which the description can be given (a tertium comparationis).
4
 The 
third purpose of the project is to show how the set of basic legal concepts can function as the 
core of a neutral framework by means of which comparative European private law is 
conducted.
5
 
                                                 
2
  See e.g. Smits 2002. 
3
  The distinction between identity and normative equivalence is roughly the following. Two parts of different 
legal systems are normatively equivalent if they have the same normative consequences. (Alchourrón and 
Bulygin 1971, 80; Brouwer 1999, 222-224). The notion of identity is stronger and implies identity of 
meaning.  
4
  The idea of using a set of basic concepts, in particular the set of Hohfeld, to facilitate comparative law was 
also suggested in Van Hoecke 1996. Van Laer 1997 is an extensive study of the use of so-called comparative 
concepts. 
5
  This third purpose is related to the methodological side of the Trento project, namely to achieve descriptions 
of legal systems that are as ‘neutral’ as possible.  
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 And finally, the set of basic legal concepts can be used to formulate proposals for a 
common European private law or parts thereof. This brings us to the fourth purpose of the 
project, namely to show how the set of basic legal concepts provides a basis for proposals for 
a common European private law. In this way, the project can contribute to the establishment 
of a common frame of reference for the European law of obligations, as promoted by the 
European Commission.
6
 
 This paper takes the first steps towards identifying the basic legal components and shows 
how these components can be used to express some central non-basic legal components. 
2.  Some methodological considerations 
In the following sections, we outline a set of basic legal concepts in terms of which European 
private law can be expressed. Before we embark on the exposition of these concepts, some 
caveats are in place.  
 First, we wish to draw attention to some fundamental distinctions. It is necessary to bear in 
mind that there is a difference between concepts or types (e.g. the concept of an obligatory 
norm, the obligatory norm as a type) and the instances of these concepts. The norm ‘The 
owner of this property shall pay his taxes’ is an obligatory norm, an instance of the concept 
‘obligatory norm’ (or, as is often said, a token of the type ‘obligatory norm’).
7
 Furthermore, 
there is a distinction to be made between the instance of a norm (e.g. ‘The owner of this 
property shall pay taxes’) and the concepts that are used to formulate this norm (e.g. the 
concept of owner and the concept of shall (obligatory)). A set of concepts should not be 
confused with a set of rules or norms. The adoption of a set of basic concepts has relatively 
little influence on the law that is modelled by means of these concepts. The choice of a type 
of brick has some influence on the buildings that are made out of them, but the main design 
decisions are independent of the brick type. The same applies to the basic concepts of the law: 
they have some influence on the contents of the law, but this influence is small in comparison 
to the choice of rules formulated in terms of them. The elaboration of a set of basic concepts 
should therefore not be mistaken for the first step towards conceptual jurisprudence 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz).
8
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 Cf. http://www.jus.unitn.it/dsg/common-core/approach.html#3.  
6
  Cf. COM(2004), 651; http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/regdoc/liste.cfm?CL=en. 
7
  On the type-token distinction, see Quine 1987, 216f. 
8
  On Begriffsjurisprudenz, see Marx 1977 and Larenz 1983, 19f. 
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 Second, we should like to emphasize that there are several ways to develop a set of the 
basic legal components. For some legal theoreticians – namely those who defended an 
imperative theory of law – there is in fact only one basic legal component: the imperative or 
obligatory norm.
9
 Others have more refined theories. In Hohfeld’s theory on fundamental 
legal conceptions,
10
 for instance, there are eight basic legal components (i.e. duties, rights, 
privileges, no-rights, powers, disabilities, liabilities and immunities). This diversity of points 
of view draws attention to a methodological problem: what are the criteria of adequate 
identification of the different types of basic legal components?
11
 We do not take an 
essentialist stance with respect to the basic legal concepts. What good concepts are depends 
on the function of these concepts in a theory. Nor do we follow an ordinary language 
approach. Instead, we try to improve on the often ambiguous terminology that is used in legal 
doctrine to refer to the basic concepts of private law. Given our theoretical aims, the rational 
reconstruction of the set of basic concepts is guided by the following regulative ideals: 
 
1.  The set of basic concepts should allow for correct representations of the contents of 
private law. A representation ought to capture the meaning of the object that is being 
represented. If in the reconstruction of private law by means of a set of basic legal 
components an essential part of the contents of the law is lost, then the conceptual 
framework is defective.  
2.  The set of basic concepts should be comprehensive. The ideal of comprehensiveness 
requires that the theory be rich enough to model all kinds of private law.  
3.  The set of basic concepts should be non-redundant (parsimonious). The ideal of non-
redundancy requires that the theory does not contain more concepts than is 
necessary.
12
 This ideal does not exclude, however, that some non-basic concepts – 
such as ‘right in personam’ – are defined in terms of basic concepts, but are used in 
modelling the law as though they were basic concepts. This can be done on the 
understanding that these pseudo-basic concepts are always used in the sense 
corresponding to their analysis in the ‘real’ basic concepts. 
                                                 
9
  Proponents of this view were John Austin (Austin 1832) and Karl Engisch (Engisch 1971, 20f.). 
10
  Cf. Hohfeld 1913. 
11
  Cf. Brouwer 1990, 8f.  
12
  It may, for instance, be argued that Hohfeldian correlatives are exact equivalents, so that for instance the 
power of A to bind B is nothing more or less than the liability of B with respect to A. If so, either power or 
liability is redundant. Cf. section 11. 
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The law makes use not only of technical legal terms, but also of a large number of terms and 
concepts that belong to the ordinary language vocabulary. Obviously, it is not well possible to 
express the full law of a country in terms of a small set of basic concepts. The project does not 
aim to do so, but is confined to such technical legal concepts as ‘irrevocable offer’, ‘property 
right’, ‘usufruct’, ‘natural obligation’, etc. We will work on the assumption that the extra-
legal terms of the different legal systems (or, better, languages) can be translated into each 
other without substantial complications. Where this assumption turns out to be incorrect, it 
will need reconsideration. 
 Rules play a central role in the law, not only because they guide our conduct, but also 
because they create conceptual networks. For instance, rules that define what counts as a 
material good or as copyright play a central role in private law, because legal consequences 
are attached to their applicability. The basic concepts that we are primarily interested in are 
the concepts that function in the formulation of rules. However, it is not possible to develop a 
theory of basic concepts without a proper understanding of how rules operate in creating 
conceptual networks. Therefore, a central part of this paper is devoted to the operation of 
rules. Moreover, in our analysis we focus on a specific type of conceptual constructs 
(‘placeholder concepts’) that are not basic concepts but that play a central role in the 
conceptual network of the law. A proper understanding of these placeholder concepts is 
crucial for the identification of the basic concepts. 
3. Language and the world13 
The basic concepts of private law are not isolated from other, non-legal basic concepts. To get 
our conceptual framework started, something must be said about these general concepts. 
When people use language, they use it as a tool that has many purposes; or, to put it 
differently, language can be used to perform different kinds of speech acts. Two important 
kinds of such speech acts are making a statement and performing a legal act 
(Rechtsgeschäft).
14
 Statements are made by means of full descriptive sentences, such as ‘The 
computer is on my desk’, ‘It’s raining’, ‘The building collapsed’ and ‘The defendant bought 
the car from the plaintiff’. If a descriptive sentence is true, the state of affairs, process or event 
                                                 
13
  Much of this section was inspired by the first chapters of Von Wright 1963. 
14
  We take it that legal acts also occur in legal systems such as the English, which do not work with this abstract 
notion but do accept related notions such as power or competence. 
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expressed by it obtains and is then called a fact. If the sentence is false, the state of affairs, 
process or event does not obtain and is not a fact.
15
 
 Utterances of sentences used for performing legal acts do not express a state of affairs, 
process or event but are themselves acts, a subtype of events. The persons who perform these 
acts aim at bringing about a legal state of affairs. If you offer me a car for € 5000 and I say to 
you that I accept your offer, it is not my intention to describe what I do, but (depending on the 
legal system) to perform my part in bringing about a contractual bond between you and me, or 
to cooperate in the transfer of the ownership of the car. 
 The law is, in a sense, a world apart. Some states of affairs, processes and events can 
obtain only in the world of the law. The existence of a contractual bond is such a state of 
affairs, as is being an owner in the legal sense. The law determines what processes or events 
bring the legal state of affairs into existence, and what processes or events terminate that state 
of affairs. One may become an owner of fruit by the process of its growing, and the owner of 
a chair by making or buying it. One may lose ownership of a ship by the process of its 
destruction in a storm, or by the event of selling and transferring it. For our purposes it is 
important to keep in mind that the law ‘causes’ some states of affairs to come to obtain or to 
disappear again.
16
 The legal world is not static, but changes continuously. Events and 
processes are changes in the set of legal states of affairs.
17
  
 Some events are acts. Acts are events that are attributed to a person. An example of an act 
is John transferring the ownership of his bike to Jane. All acts belong to, are tokens of, several 
action types. For instance, the act by which John transfers the ownership of his bike to Jane 
necessarily belongs to the action type ‘transfer of ownership’. At the same time, however, the 
act may be performing a contract (John sold the bike to Jane), breaking a promise to Mary 
(John promised to transfer the ownership of the bike to Mary), an act of fraud against John’s 
creditors, and many other things. As shown in the following section, human action is 
regulated by prescriptions and prohibitions of action types, not individual acts. 
                                                 
15
  A more extensive discussion of speech acts in general can be found in Searle 1969. Application and 
modification of Searle’s theory with special application to the law can be found in Hage 2005, 164f. 
16
  This theme is elaborated in MacCormick 1974. 
17
  For the purposes of this article there is no need to elaborate on the distinction between events (that happen or 
occur) and processes (that are going on). From now on we will therefore simply use ‘event’ to refer to both of 
them. 
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4. Legal norms 
A legal norm is a state of affairs composed of three elements.
18
 The first element is an action 
type, such as polluting the environment, or walking. The second element is a deontic operator, 
namely ‘ought to’, ‘ought not to’, ‘permitted to do’ or ‘permitted to refrain from’. The third 
element is a set of one or more persons addressed by the duty or permission. This third 
element is often implicit, if the duty or permission holds for everybody. It is also possible that 
a duty or permission holds for a smaller but still indefinite set of persons, such as all 
inhabitants of a region, all males, or all car drivers. And, finally, there are duties and 
permissions for one or more individuals, such as the duty for John to repay his debt, and the 
permission for Peter, Paul and Mary to prepare the church fancy fair.
19
 Here are some 
examples: 
1. It is permitted to enter the building 
action type: enter the building 
deontic operator: permitted to do 
norm addressees: everybody 
2. John should keep the environment clean  
action type: keep the environment clean  
deontic operator: should (ought to) 
norm addressees: John 
3. It is forbidden for car drivers to drive on the left-hand side of the road 
action type: drive on the left-hand side of the road 
deontic operator: ought not to 
norm addressees: car drivers 
 
                                                 
18
  In the literature, the notion of a norm is used in several senses. See for instance, Von Wright 1963 and Kelsen 
1979. In this paper we focus on norms that prescribe or permit behaviour. Power-conferring norms will be 
discussed under the heading of legal rules. 
19
  There may be a duty (or permission) for some but not all persons of a certain group (e.g. ‘One of you ought 
to pay the victim’). This type of norm frequently gives rise to problems of coordination. Normally, therefore, 
the purpose of this kind of norm is better served by a duty for all (‘Each of you ought to pay the victim’) and 
the provision that as soon as one of them pays, the duty of the others is cancelled. 
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 4. It is permitted to refrain from voting 
 action type: voting 
 deontic operator: permitted to refrain from 
 norm addressees: all voters 
 
Legal duties concern action types, not individual acts. The purpose of legal duties is to guide 
human behaviour. They can do so only if they deal with future behaviour. An individual act 
has already been performed and can no longer be guided, while future individual acts cannot 
be identified by a definite description and therefore cannot not be referred to in a norm 
formulation.
20
 However, legal duties can be used to evaluate individual acts as legal or illegal. 
If an act violated a legal duty, it was normally illegal;
21
 if it did not violate a legal duty, it was 
legal.
22
 
 If an action type is not prohibited, it is permitted to do acts of that type. This does not mean 
that all acts of the action type are permitted; it merely means that the fact that an act belongs 
to the type is in itself no reason why it is illegal. The act may belong to another action type 
that is forbidden. For instance, there is no prohibition against pushing buttons, and in this 
sense it is permitted to push buttons. However, if pushing a particular button is a way to 
torture a person, it is not permitted (it is forbidden) to push this button. 
 We use the term norm as a synonym for a duty or permission. As described above, there 
are prescriptive and prohibitive norms (duties) and permissive norms (permissions to do and 
permissions to refrain from doing). From these four, we use the notion of a prescriptive norm 
(a duty to do) as a primitive; the other three norm types can be defined in terms of prescriptive 
norms, namely as prescriptions to refrain from some action type (prohibitions) and the 
absence of prescriptions (permissions to do and permissions to refrain from doing). This gives 
us our first basic concept of European private law. 
5. Semantics 
In semantics (the study of meaning) it is customary to define the meaning of some words – in 
particular nouns, verbs and adjectives – in terms of other words. A traditional example is that 
                                                 
20
  Brouwer 1990, 140-142. 
21
  The qualifier ‘normally’ was inserted because an act that violated a legal duty may in exceptional 
circumstances have been legal because of a ground of justification. 
22
  More on evaluation by means of norms in Taylor 1961, 32f. 
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‘man’ means ‘rational animal’.
23
 A legal example is that ‘obligation’ means ‘duty with a 
corresponding claim right’. Under ideal circumstances, both definiendum (what is defined) 
and definiens (the definition) mean exactly the same, so that things that can be classified 
under the definiendum can be classified under the definiens, too, and vice versa.  
 It often occurs, however, that the definiens consists of a number of terms, most but not 
necessarily all of which should be applicable if something is to be classifiable under the 
definiendum. A dog, for instance, normally has four legs, and this characteristic might be 
included in the definition of ‘dog’ (e.g. a dog is a four-legged animal that barks and is friendly 
to humans). However, there can be dogs with three legs, so having four legs is not a necessary 
condition for being a dog. In the law a similar phenomenon occurs. Normally, an obligation 
entails that there is a duty that can be enforced. However, a so-called natural obligation cannot 
be enforced. Despite that fact, natural obligations have so much in common with normal 
obligations that they are classified as obligations nevertheless. In these cases – where the 
definiens does not consist of necessary characteristics but specifies the characteristics of a 
normal species of the genus – we speak of stereotype concepts.
24
  
 The elements of a concept’s definition are normally also conditions for the concept’s 
applicability. For instance, if there is no duty, there cannot be an obligation. However, not all 
conditions for the applicability of a term or concept are necessarily part of the concept’s 
meaning. This is very clear in the law, where the conditions for becoming an owner do not 
coincide with the meaning of the concept ‘owner’. Obviously, it is not part of the meaning of 
this concept that one can become the owner of a good by inheritance. Nor is it the case that 
the combination of all possible ways of becoming an owner forms the meaning of the concept 
of ownership.  
 The fact that a concept is applicable and something can be classified as an instance of that 
concept normally has particular consequences. To again use ownership as an example: if 
somebody is an owner, this implies that he has the power to transfer ownership to somebody 
else. Moreover, the lack of the power to transfer ownership normally means that one is not the 
owner. However, the availability of the power to transfer is not part of the meaning of the 
concept ‘owner’. It is possible to understand what ‘owner’ means without being able to spell 
out all or even most of the legal consequences of ownership. In general, it holds that the 
                                                 
23
  See e.g. Leech 1974, 95f and, from a more philosophical perspective, Carnap 1956. 
24
  Cf. Putnam 1975 and Smith 1990. 
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meaning of a word or concept does not necessarily coincide with the consequences of its 
applicability. 
 We find that the applicability of a concept goes together with a number of circumstances. 
Some of these circumstances form the meaning of the concept, while others belong to the 
conditions of applicability without being part of the meaning, or they belong to the 
consequences of the concept’s applicability, again without being part of the meaning. 
 In this paper, we identify a set of basic concepts in terms of which the technical concepts 
of European private law can be expressed. Characteristic of a basic concept is that it cannot be 
specified in terms of other, more elementary concepts. Concepts that can be specified 
exhaustively in terms of more elementary concepts are called compound concepts. One 
example of a compound concept from the Dutch law of obligations is the notion of an 
obligation itself. Arguably,
25
 if there rests an obligation upon A towards B to do X, this means 
that A has the legal duty to do X and that B has a claim right
26
 against A concerning this duty. 
Another example of a compound concept from the Dutch law of obligations is the concept of 
a ‘fault’. That a person is at fault means that she has committed an illegal act and that this act 
can be attributed to this person.  
 As mentioned above, it is often the case that a concept can be specified in terms of other 
concepts, but that this specification is not exhaustive. The concept of ownership provides a 
case in point. Such concepts are called stereotype concepts. In section 8, we discuss 
placeholder concepts, which are not alternatives for compound concepts or stereotype 
concepts, but rather conceptual constructs that make it possible to ignore the difference 
between these two concept types.  
6. Rules 
The possibility for legal acts to bring about changes in the world of the law rests on the 
existence of rules. If the acceptance of an offer leads to a contract, this is because there exists 
a rule to the effect that an offer followed by the acceptance of that offer creates a contract. 
This is illustrative of the role that rules play in the law. Rules create connections between 
concepts (e.g. ‘fault’ means ‘attributable illegal act’), between events (e.g. by making one 
event also count as another: writing a letter counts, under certain circumstances, as making an 
offer), between states of affairs (e.g. the state of affairs that one is married implies the state of 
                                                 
25
  Cf. Hage forthcoming. 
26
  More on claim rights in section 9.2. 
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affairs that one ought to take care of one’s spouse) and between events and states of affairs 
(e.g. the event of concluding a marriage contract leads to the state of affairs of being married).  
 We distinguish four main types of rules, namely:  
− Meaning rules. These specify the meaning relations between compound and stereotype 
concepts on the one hand, and the concepts that are constituents of their meanings on 
the other hand. An example is the already mentioned rule that a ‘fault’ is an attributable 
illegal act. 
− Counts-as rules. These specify under what circumstances a kind of event also counts as 
another kind of event. An example of a counts-as rule is the rule that making a certain 
declaration (e.g. ‘Do you want to buy my car for € 2000?’) counts, under the suitable 
circumstances, as making an offer.  
− Causal rules. These bring about that an event has a state of affairs as its consequence. 
An example of a causal rule is the rule that if one commits a tort, this event leads to a 
legal obligation to pay damages. Obviously, the causation in question is a special legal 
form of causation and not causation in the traditional physical sense. 
− Constitutive rules. These bring about that some state of affairs normally goes together 
with another state of affairs. An example of a constitutive rule is that if one is under a 
legal obligation towards somebody else to do something, the other person normally is 
competent to transfer the claim right that is part of the obligation. 
In the case of legal acts, counts-as rules and causal rules are closely connected. A counts-as 
rule indicates what behaviour counts as the legal act in question, while the causal rule 
indicates what the legal consequences of this legal act are. We shall briefly return to this 
connection between counts-as rules and causal rules in the following section.  
 It may seem that this fourfold division overlooks rules that prescribe or permit behaviour.
27
 
Obviously, there are such rules. We propose to analyse them as rules that have as a result the 
existence of a duty, a prohibition or a permission (a normative state of affairs), and therefore 
are constitutive or causal rules. For instance, the rule that when it gets dark, car drivers ought 
to turn on their car lights generates the normative state of affairs (duty) that car drivers ought 
to turn on their lights when it gets dark. And given the case that John is driving as it is getting 
                                                 
27
  The three kinds of rules distinguished above would all count as constitutive rules in the sense of Searle 1969. 
Searle opposes these constitutive rules to so-called regulative rules. In our view, regulative rules are either 
causal or constitutive rules (in our sense), which bring about the existence of a norm. More on norms, which 
in our terminology are not rules, in section 4. 
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dark, the rule generates the normative state of affairs (duty) that John ought to turn on his 
lights.  
7. Legal acts 
One of the more complex phenomena in the law is the legal act. The basic idea is quite 
simple: a legal act is an act performed with the intention to create legal consequences, where 
the consequences take effect because of the intention to create them. The existence of legal 
acts is made possible by legal rules. These rules do three things. They: 
1. indicate who is competent to perform a legal act of a particular type; 
2. define what precisely counts as a legal act of this type (how the legal act is to be 
performed); 
3. attach legal consequences to the legal act. 
An example of a legal act is making a last will. A legal system contains constitutive rules that 
specify who is competent to make last wills. In the Netherlands, for instance, generally 
speaking only human beings who are 16 years or older have this competence (article 4:55 of 
the Dutch Civil Code). There are also counts-as rules that specify how last wills can be made 
and that bring about that particular physical acts, for instance signing a particular type of 
document in the presence of a notary, count as making a last will (article 4:93 and following 
of the Dutch Civil Code). And there is a causal rule that attaches a legal consequence to the 
making of a last will, namely that a valid last will exists. This latter state of affairs leads via 
constitutive rules to additional legal consequences, for instance that a person mentioned in the 
last will has a right to part of the estate of the testator when the latter dies and that the testator 
is competent to revoke the last will (article 4:42 Dutch Civil Code).  
 The following figure depicts the functions of the different types of rules with regard to the 
legal act of making a last will
28
:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
  The figure does not represent the competence-conferring rules.  
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As this example illustrates, the counts-as rule specifies what counts as the making of a last 
will. Signing a document in the presence of a notary counts under suitable circumstances as 
making a last will. This means that the signing of the document is at the same time also 
‘another’ act, namely making a last will.
29
 The causal rule brings about that an event (the 
making of a last will) legally ‘causes’ the existence of a valid last will. The existence of a 
valid last will in its turn has a number of legal consequences, specified by constitutive rules. 
 Performing legal acts requires the competence to do so. The issue of competence arises 
because legal acts do not exist outside the law. They are a creation of the law and one of the 
things the law must do is determine who is capable of performing such acts. Being competent 
is a legal status that has no physical counterpart. This status is assigned to an actor by a rule, 
in general because the actor has particular characteristics. For instance, in Dutch law there is a 
rule that assigns to the owner of a good the status of being competent to transfer the 
ownership of that good. This constitutive rule attaches the state of affairs that a person x is 
competent to transfer the ownership to the state of affairs that person x is owner. By 
                                                 
29
  The question whether an act is identical to the ‘same’ act under another description that refers to the act’s 
consequences (e.g. shooting and killing) has been debated in the philosophy of action. A similar discussion is 
possible about the issue whether an event is identical to the same event under a different description that 
refers to the event’s consequences. We refer the interested reader to Ginet 1995 and Lombard 1995 and the 
references there. 
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distinguishing between actors who are competent and actors who are not competent, the law 
may limit the set of persons who are capable of performing legal acts of a certain type.  
 Competences may be generic or more or less specific. A person may have the generic 
competence to perform legal acts of a private law nature, without having the specific 
competence to perform a certain kind of legal act. For instance, persons who are fifteen years 
old may have the generic competence to perform legal acts and be competent to buy a 
sandwich, but may not be competent to make a last will. Furthermore, one may have the 
competence to perform a certain type of legal act (e.g. making contracts), without having the 
more specific competence to perform a certain kind of that type of legal act (e.g. a contract 
that transfers ownership).  
 A competence does not imply the permission to do what one is competent to do, although a 
competent person will normally be permitted to use the competence,  because otherwise the 
competence would not make much sense. The sanction of incompetence is normally that an 
act performed by an incompetent actor is void. It does not count as a valid legal act of the type 
in question. In case a specific competence is needed to perform a certain kind of legal act, 
being competent in a more generic sense has no other legal consequences than that the 
validity of the legal act is not lacking because of generic incompetence.
30
 On the other hand, 
if a more specific competence is not required, the generic competence suffices and the actor is 
able to bring about the legal consequences of the legal act if he follows the rules that specify 
how it can be performed. 
 Because the concept of competence cannot be defined in terms of other concepts, we treat 
it as one of the basic concepts.  
8. Placeholder concepts as exemplified by ownership 
In section 5, we distinguished compound and stereotype concepts as well as the basic 
concepts that this paper aims to identify. Although the distinctions between these different 
kinds of concepts can be made in theory, it is not very easy to apply them in practice. 
Concepts do not come labelled as ‘basic’, ‘compound’ or ‘stereotype’. Moreover, the 
distinction between on the one hand characteristics that are part of a concept’s meaning, and 
on the other hand the conditions for and consequences of the applicability of the concept, is 
                                                 
30
  The present analysis of competence is confined to the competence that is necessary to perform legal acts. The 
law also uses the notions of competence and incompetence  to refer to, respectively to limit the possibility of 
certain legal states of affairs. For instance, somebody or something may be incompetent to be the bearer of 
legal rights or duties. 
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easier to make in theory than in practice. To avoid the complications that follow from the 
difficulties associated with applying these distinctions, we can make use of a conceptual 
construction, namely that of the placeholder concept.  
 The idea behind the construction of a placeholder concept is that the role of a number of 
legal concepts is to function as an intermediary in legal arguments from the conditions in 
which these concepts are applicable to the consequences of the concept’s applicability. Let us 
take the concept of ownership as an example. The law knows several ways to obtain 
ownership, such as creation of a good, inheritance or transfer of the right. Moreover, the law 
attaches many legal consequences to the existence of ownership, such as the duty for 
everybody except the owner not to destroy the owned good, and the competence of the owner 
to transfer the ownership or to create a more limited right (e.g. mortgage) with respect to the 
owned object.  
 In theory, the legal consequences of the existence of ownership might be attached to all the 
different ways in which ownership is acquired. For instance, one might have the rule that if 
one has inherited a good, all other persons have the duty not to destroy this good. In this way 
it is possible to do without the concept of ownership altogether, because all the legal 
consequences that are traditionally attached to the existence of such a right are then attached 
to all different ways of what would traditionally be ways of acquiring ownership.
31
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is more economical, however, to work with an intermediate concept – the concept of 
ownership – that forms the intermediary between the rules that specify under which 
circumstances particular legal consequences obtain, and the rules that specify which legal 
consequences obtain if the conditions of the former rules are satisfied. A schematic example 
may illustrate this point. Let us assume that there are three ways to acquire ownership and that 
there are four legal consequences attached to the existence of such a right. If a legal system 
                                                 
31
  Cf. Ross 1957, MacCormick 1974,  Brouwer 1999, Hage 2004. 
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uses the concept of ownership, it needs seven rules (three causal rules plus four constitutive 
rules) to regulate this subject (see the figure below). If the concept of a property right is 
lacking, it takes twelve (three times four) rules to make the same regulation (see the figure 
above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a logical point of view, the intermediate concept is empty: it is nothing more than a 
placeholder in an argument from the conditions that specify when this concept is applicable to 
the consequences of the concept’s applicability. The ‘real’ law is embodied in the rules that 
specify the conditions and the consequences of the concept’s applicability. In theory, any one 
of these rules might change without a change in the intermediate concept, which is nothing 
more than a placeholder in an argument. 
 When we look at the meaning of ‘ownership’, the situation is obviously different. The 
concept of ownership in its various guises has always and everywhere been connected with a 
particular content and with particular ways of acquisition. The details of what counts as 
ownership may vary with time and place, but the main lines remain the same, under penalty of 
becoming a different concept. It may be very difficult to specify precisely what the conditions 
for ownership are, especially if these conditions need to be both necessary and sufficient, but 
this does not detract from the fact that there is a number of conditions that are characteristic of 
ownership, and usually most of them are satisfied if something is owned. 
 For the purposes of our present project, however, the logical view of ownership as a 
placeholder in arguments from the conditions to the consequences of being an owner is more 
useful than the semantic view according to which ownership is connected to particular 
characteristics. According to this logical view, the existence of ownership can be treated as a 
placeholder that comes about as a legal consequence if particular conditions are satisfied, and 
to which in its turn particular legal consequences are attached. The rules that specify the 
conditions of applicability and the final legal consequences are what really count. The concept 
of ownership, if it is treated as a placeholder concept, is no more than a name that makes it 
ownership 
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easy to represent particular lines of legal reasoning. By treating a concept as a placeholder, it 
becomes possible to ignore the difficult question which characteristics of a concept belong to 
its proper meaning, and to confine the analysis of legal concepts to a specification of the 
conditions under which the placeholder concept is applicable and the consequences of this 
applicability. The ‘meaning’ of the concept is in this way replaced by the rules that specify 
these conditions and consequences.  
 The following scheme gives an overview of the different kinds of concepts that we have 
identified thus far. The interrupted line to the placeholder concepts indicates that placeholder 
concepts are not really a subcategory of the legal concepts, but that they are merely a 
convenient way to analyse legal concepts. In particular it is important to realize that basic and 
non-basic concepts form mutually exclusive categories, but that placeholder concepts are 
means to analyse non-basic concepts (and perhaps even basic concepts). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. The Hohfeldian concepts 
The power of our two basic notions (i.e. duty and competence) can be illustrated by 
comparing them to the set of fundamental legal ‘conceptions’ as developed by Hohfeld. 
Hohfeld distinguished eight related conceptions, some of which are often denoted by the 
ambiguous term ‘right’. These eight conceptions are those of a right, no-right, privilege, duty, 
power, disability, immunity and liability. Characteristic of Hohfeld’s analysis is that he treats 
all of these conceptions as relational. For instance, a right is always a right of some person 
Ordinary 
language 
Legal concepts 
Concepts 
Ordinary language concepts 
Placeholder  
concepts 
Compound  
concepts 
Basic legal concepts: 
− legal duties 
− legal competences 
 
Stereotype 
concepts 
Legal concepts 
Non-basic legal 
concepts 
 - 21 - 
against some person and an immunity is likewise always the immunity of somebody against 
somebody. 
 The eight conceptions are related, namely by means of the relations of opposition and 
correlation. If two conceptions are correlated (equivalent), the applicability of one entails the 
applicability of the other, and vice versa. If two conceptions are opposed, the applicability of 
the one entails the non-applicability of the other, and vice versa. If we designate the direction 
of the relation by means of the order of the persons and the action type involved, so that 
‘Duty(x,y,z)’ means that x has a duty towards y to do z, ‘Right(y,x,z)’ that y has a right 
towards x that x does z, ‘Priv(x,y, not z)’ that x has the privilege towards y not to do z and 
‘No-Right (y,x,z)’ that y has no right towards x that x does z, then the relations between the 
first set of four conceptions can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relations in the second set of four conceptions are depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some examples may illustrate these conceptions. Suppose that x has contracted with y and is 
as a consequence under the obligation towards y to pay € 100 (z). Under these circumstances, 
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y has a right
32
 against x to be paid € 100. The right of y and the duty of x are but two sides of 
the same coin. If x is not under a duty to pay € 100 to y, x has the privilege towards y not to 
pay this amount of money. This privilege is nothing other than the absence of the duty.
33
 
Similarly, the no-right of y towards x with regard to the payment of € 100 is nothing other 
than the absence of the right of y towards x with regard to that payment. In a sense, therefore, 
we do not need the conceptions of the privilege and the no-right. They are superfluous, 
because their contents may be expressed by using the concepts of duty and right and the 
logical operator for negation.  
 Suppose that y has made an offer to x to buy one of x’s paintings for € 200, which x can 
accept or refuse. By accepting the offer, a sales contract will be concluded. This can be 
expressed by saying that x has the power over y to accept the offer (z). In the given example 
there are rules that determine that acceptance of the offer will bring about a contract and that 
the contract will bring about a set of further legal consequences, including the duty for y 
towards x to pay €200. The power to accept therefore implies, among other things, the power 
to create this duty. Seen from the perspective of y, the same situation can be described by 
saying that y is liable to the acceptance of the offer by x and therefore liable to be brought 
under the duty to pay €200 to x. If x has no such power over y, one can speak of a disability 
of x to accept the offer, which implies the disability to bring y under this duty. In such 
circumstances, y is immune against x accepting the offer and immune against x bringing him 
under the duty. Again, strictly speaking the conceptions of a disability and immunity are 
superfluous. The first of these concepts may be expressed by the negation of power, and the 
second by the negation of liability.  
9.1 Duties  
Now let us see how the Hohfeldian concepts compare with the set of two basic concepts we 
defined above. We shall start with the concept of a duty. There are many legal duties, such as 
the duty to drive on the right-hand side of the road, the duty not to pollute the environment 
excessively, the duty not to kill human beings, the duty not to interfere with somebody else’s 
property and the duty to repay one’s loans. Some of these duties exist in order to protect the 
general interest – such as the duty not to pollute the environment excessively and the duty to 
drive on the right-hand side of the road – while other duties are there to protect the interests of 
                                                 
32
  More about rights in section 9.2. 
33
  The Hohfeldian notion of a privilege is strongly related to our notion of a permission. The crucial difference 
is that permissions are not relational, while Hohfeldian privileges are. 
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one or more specific persons, such as the duty to repay one’s loans and the duty not to 
interfere with somebody else’s property. 
 If, but not necessarily only if, a duty exists to protect somebody else’s interests, this other 
person can be given legal means to enforce this duty. For instance, if A has the duty to repay 
his loan to B, B will normally have legal means to enforce A’s duty. This need not be the 
case, however. In the case of a so-called natural obligation, A may have a duty in the interest 
of B, whereas B has no legal means to enforce this duty.
34
 If A has a legal duty and B has 
legal means to enforce this duty, we say that B has a claim right towards A to the effect that A 
fulfils his duty.
35
 
 The first thing to notice is that not all legal duties are relational in the sense that they are 
duties towards somebody else. An example is the duty to wear a helmet when driving a 
motorcycle. Apparently, Hohfeld’s analysis does not capture all basic legal concepts. 
However, as soon as we accept that the law also uses a non-relational notion of a legal duty, 
the question arises whether the relational notion of a duty makes sense. Suppose that A has 
both the legal duty to wear a helmet and the legal duty to pay B € 100. In both cases, A has a 
duty to do something. Are these duties different as regards a duty to do something, because in 
the first case there is no correlated right-holder, while in the second case there is? We readily 
admit that the two cases are legally different, but in our opinion this difference is not a 
difference in the kind of duty. The difference is that in the latter case there is somebody with a 
right corresponding to the duty, while in the former case there is no such person. The duties in 
themselves are essentially similar. Thus, the second thing to notice is that the relational 
analysis of legal duties as provided by Hohfeld is misleading, because it suggests that the 
basic concept of a legal duty is relational.  
 Does this mean that legal duties as analysed by Hohfeld (that is, duties with correlated 
rights) do not exist? We think the answer is negative, because Hohfeldian duties can be, and 
actually are, defined by legal systems as compound concepts, namely as combinations of legal 
duties and corresponding claim rights. 
9.2 Rights 
If our analysis of legal duties is correct, Hohfeld must be wrong in his view that legal duties 
are the correlatives of legal rights: not every legal duty has a legal right as its correlative. This 
                                                 
34
  In Dutch law, gambling debts are such ‘natural obligations’.  
35
  Claim rights should be distinguished from rights that do not imply claims on other persons, such as political 
rights. 
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means that the analysis of rights cannot be based exhaustively on legal duties and that rights 
need an analysis of their own. 
 What, then, is a legal right? Let us begin by excluding fundamental human rights – such as 
the right to freedom of speech – as a proper analysis of such rights is beyond the scope of this 
paper, and seems to be quite complicated.
36
 Second, we must, at least prima facie, distinguish 
between rights against other persons (iura in personam) and rights on certain ‘things’ (iura in 
rem).  
 Before continuing with an analysis of rights against persons and on things, we want to 
point out a complication, namely that the meaning of the concept of a right cannot well be 
distinguished from the conditions under which a right exists and the consequences attached to 
the presence of a right. As we have seen, this complication can be circumvented by analysing 
the concept of a right as a placeholder concept, defined by the rules that specify the conditions 
under which rights come into existence and the consequences of their presence. These rules 
are rules of particular legal systems and the details differ from system to system. This means 
that there is probably no placeholder concept of a legal right that is completely identical in the 
different legal systems. Consequently, the best we can do is try to give an analysis of the 
notion of a right in a specific legal system in terms of our basic concepts. Given our 
background in the Dutch legal system, we take this system as the starting point of our 
analysis. 
 Let us start with rights on ‘things’, and confine ourselves, to keep matters relatively 
uncontroversial, to the ownership of material goods. Suppose that A has the ownership of a 
book. This implies that A is permitted to use the book, to damage it and even to destroy it. 
Other persons, who do not have the ownership of the book, are not permitted to use, damage 
or destroy the book. In other words, they have the legal duty not to use, damage or destroy the 
book. This duty can be lifted by a permission granted by A, who is apparently competent to 
grant such a permission. Moreover, A has the competence to transfer the ownership of the 
book to somebody else. This leads us to the beginning of an analysis of ownership: 
                                                 
36
  See Alexy 2002, especially Chapter 4.  
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If A has the ownership of a material good G, amongst others the following legal consequences 
hold: 
− all other persons have prima facie37 the legal duty not to use, damage or destroy G, or to 
interfere with A’s use and enjoyment of G; 
− A is permitted to use, damage or destroy G; 
− A has the competence to grant other persons the permission to use, damage or destroy 
G; 
− A has the competence to transfer the ownership of the book to somebody else. 
A placeholder concept is defined not only by the rules that specify the legal consequences of 
its existence, but also by the rules that specify when such a state of affairs obtains and/or 
under which circumstances it comes into being. The following rules give a very partial 
specification of the ways in which the state of affairs that A is the owner of G can come 
about: 
− if A has made G from material that did not belong to somebody else, A is the owner of 
G; 
− if A has inherited G, A is the owner of G; 
− if the ownership of G was transferred to A by the former owner of G, A is the owner of 
G. 
The states of affairs that A has inherited G and that the ownership was transferred to A can 
themselves be analysed as placeholder concepts that need specification by means of rules. In 
general it holds that rules that specify placeholder concepts may refer to other legal states of 
affairs that need to be specified by additional rules. One of the presuppositions of our project 
is that every such a chain of specifications can ‘bottom out’ on a specification in terms of the 
limited set of basic concepts and ordinary language concepts. 
 Rights against persons can also be analysed as placeholder concepts, the precise conditions 
and consequences of which are specified by the legal system in which they are used. Having 
such a claim right is a placeholder to which legal rules attach a number of legal consequences, 
usually including consequences that make it possible to enforce the fulfilment of a legal duty. 
These legal consequences may include that the right-holder has a competence to start 
                                                 
37
  The clause ‘prima facie’ is meant to express that the prohibition against interference is amenable to 
exceptions. The nature of these exceptions, which has to do with the defeasibility of rule application, is 
outside the scope of this paper. Details can be found in e.g. Hage 1997 and 2003. 
 - 26 - 
proceedings (an action), a judge has the duty to condemn the debtor to pay the money, if so 
requested by the right-holder, and the competence to compensate when the right-holder has 
not only the right to be paid by his debtor but also a duty to pay this debtor. They may also 
include the specific competence to alienate the claim right.  
9.3 Powers 
Hohfeld’s notion of a power seems similar to our notion of competence. We prefer the term 
‘competence’ because it is less ambiguous. There is, however, an important difference 
between Hohfeld’s powers and our competences, because the powers are relational, while 
competences are not. This is reflected in the fact that a power has a correlate in the form of a 
liability, while such a correlate is lacking for competences in our sense.  
 Let us give an example to illustrate this difference. The owner of a good has the power to 
enforce his right against – in principle – all other persons. This means that all these other 
persons are liable to have such an enforcement exercised against them. At first sight, this 
liability seems uninteresting, being nothing other than the power looked at from the side of 
somebody who possibly undergoes the consequences of the exercise of this power. From this 
perspective, only one thing – the power – can be looked at from different sides. In fact, it is 
this perspective that we have adopted and that made us decide to adopt a non-relational notion 
of competence.  
 There is something to be said in favour of the relational notion of power, however. 
Sometimes people are exempt from the consequences that the exercise of a power would 
normally have. If A leases his car to B, he can no longer enforce his ownership against B by 
forbidding B to use the car. B has, to use Hohfeld’s terminology, an immunity and A lacks the 
power to enforce his right against B if B uses A’s car, a power A would normally have. 
According to Hohfeld, such an immunity is the opposite of a liability, and the correlate of a 
disability (the lack of power). This suggests that the notion of a liability has meaning 
independent of the notion of a power, namely as the opposite of an immunity. The relational 
concept of power, according to which a power of A against B excludes an immunity of B 
against A, accounts for this relation between a power and an immunity. If we propose to use a 
non-relational notion of competence, we must give an account of how immunities can be 
expressed in terms of our set of non-relational basic concepts. In order to do so, we must 
interrupt our discussion of the Hohfeldian concepts for an account of the ‘logic’ of legal rules. 
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10. Intermezzo: the ‘logic’ of rules38 
Most legal rules attach consequences to the occurrence of a particular event or to the presence 
of particular states of affairs (see section 6). To which event or state of affairs the 
consequences are attached is specified in the rule conditions; what the attached consequences 
are, is specified in the rule conclusion. Apparently, the ‘logic’ of rules – how they work – is 
quite simple: if the conditions of the rule are satisfied, its consequence occurs; otherwise, it 
does not occur, at least not because of the rule. Upon closer examination, however, the 
operation of rules turns out to be more complicated. It is, in exceptional circumstances, 
possible to apply at least some rules by analogy, which means that the rule’s consequences 
occur in a case, even though its conditions are, strictly speaking, not satisfied in that case. It is 
also possible – again in exceptional circumstances – not to apply a rule to a case, even though 
the rule’s conditions are satisfied. This may happen, for instance, if the rule conflicts with a 
rule that has precedence over it, or if application of the rule would be against the rule’s 
purpose. 
 For our present purposes, we are most interested in the possibility to make an exception to 
a rule, where an exception is taken to occur if a rule’s conditions are satisfied and the rule is 
nevertheless not applied. Exceptions are always confined to particular cases; they have no 
impact on a rule’s validity. An invalidating circumstance is not the same as an exception to a 
rule. For instance, if we make an exception to the rule that it is forbidden to steal for 
somebody who stole a loaf of bread to avoid starvation, this does not mean that the rule that 
forbids stealing has become invalid. The rule remains valid, even though we do not apply it in 
a particular case. Moreover, exceptions do not imply that the rule reads differently than it 
would seem at first sight. The rule that forbids stealing does not read that it is forbidden to 
steal, except if one steals a loaf of bread to avoid starvation. It still reads that it is forbidden to 
steal, even if one makes an exception to the rule in some cases of stealing bread.  
 Exceptions to rules do not occur just like that; there must be a reason to make an exception. 
What counts as such a reason depends, in the case of legal rules, on the legal system in which 
the rule exists. Legal systems tend to have rules that specify, not necessarily exhaustively, 
when to make exceptions to rules. The so-called lex specialis conflict rule is an example of 
such a rule. It says that if a more general rule conflicts with a more specific rule in a particular 
case, the more specific rule should be applied and there is an exception to the more general 
                                                 
38
  A more elaborate informal discussion of the operation of rules can be found in Schauer 1991. A logically 
more precise discussion is Hage 1997. 
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rule. Another example is the rule that permits a judge not to apply a valid rule if the 
application of that rule in a particular case would reasonably be unacceptable.  
11. The Hohfeldian concepts continued 
11.1 Immunities 
The existence of immunities can be analysed in terms of exceptions to rules. Part of the 
analysis of ownership is the existence of a rule that forbids persons other than the owner to 
use the owned object. Another part of the analysis is the existence of a rule that empowers the 
owner to enforce his right against those who make infringements.  
 If the owner of a car A leases his car to B, A creates for B with regard to the car an 
exception to the rule that non-owners are forbidden to use owned objects. As a consequence, 
B is permitted to use the car, even though the car is still owned by A. As a further 
consequence, B’s use of the car is no longer an infringement of A’s ownership. Yet another 
consequence is that the conditions of the rule that owners can enforce their property rights 
against those who infringe upon it, are not satisfied in the case of A, B and the car.  
 As this example illustrates, there is no need for a relational notion of power to account for 
the phenomenon that some people are immune against the exercise of the right of ownership. 
The immunity of B is a direct consequence of the non-applicability of the rule that empowers 
A to enforce his ownership, and an indirect consequence of the permission that B had to use 
the car, which was granted to him by means of the lease contract. Diagrammatically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, the immunity of B is the result of the non-applicability of the rule that grants 
the power to enforce the ownership (there is no infringement).  
 Immunities can also be a result of exceptions to rules that create competences. An example 
from Dutch law is the regulation of the situation in which somebody makes a declaration that 
seems to be a legal act, but without the intention necessary for the performance of such an act. 
Normally the person who made such a declaration is competent to adduce absence of the 
permission to 
use the car 
lease contract  
non-applicability of 
the rule that 
empowers 
enforcement of 
ownership against 
infringements 
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intention and to invoke nullity of the declaration. However, art. 3:35 of the Dutch Civil Code 
states that if the declaration was made towards somebody who in good faith relied on the 
declaration, this competence is absent. The rule of this article indicates that in cases of 
reliance in good faith, there is an exception to the rule that assigns competence to invoke 
nullity because of a lack of relevant intention. Again, it turns out that we do not need a 
relational notion of power to account for the presence of an immunity. Our non-relational 
notion of competence, in combination with the possibility to make an exception to the 
competence-assigning rule, suffices to account for the immunity of the relying party against 
the general competence of the declaring party to invoke absence of intention. The exception to 
the rule brings about that  the competence, which exists in general, does not exist in this 
particular case. 
11.2 No-right, privilege, disability, liability 
We have argued that the notions of competence, right, duty and immunity need not be 
relational, and that the notions of right and immunity can be analysed in terms of our 
primitive set and are therefore not basic notions themselves. We have not yet discussed the 
Hohfeldian notions of no-right, privilege, disability and liability, and we do not intend to do 
so extensively. The reason is that these notions are not independent, but merely express the 
absence of, respectively, a right, duty, power and immunity. They are what Hohfeld called 
‘opposites’ of rights, duties, powers and immunities. What we wrote about these latter notions 
need only be read in a negative way to apply to the former notions. 
12. Conclusion 
We have set out the main lines of a project that aims to develop a set of basic concepts in 
terms of which the private law of European countries can be expressed. The availability of 
such a set should facilitate the comparative study of European systems of private law and be 
helpful for efforts to harmonize these systems.  
 As hypothesis for such a set of basic concepts, we propose the set consisting of the notions 
duty and competence. The existence of duties and competences are basic legal states of affairs 
that owe their existence to rules. To show the feasibility of this hypothesis, we used this set to 
analyse the notions of a legal act, a claim right and an immunity. Moreover, we discussed the 
Hohfeldian alternative to our set and argued why our set should be preferred to Hohfeld’s.  
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